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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000

BARBARA J. MOTES,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

Case No. 88-0015-CA

:
Priority No. 14b

PRESTON J. MOTES,

:

Defendant/Respondent
Cross Appellant.

:
000O000

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
AND
RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

Barbara

J.

Motes,

submits

the

following Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Respondent/
Cross Appellant, Preston J. Motes.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case.

As was stated in Appellant's

initial Statement of the Case, it involves errors made by the
trial court in the postponed division of Respondent's military
pension benefits and the allocation of income tax exemptions
between the parties.
error

Respondent, in his cross appeal, claims

in the manner the trial court dealt with Appellant's

inheritance and related appreciation.

1

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
Appellant relies on the Statement of Facts set forth in her
principal

Brief

on

pages

3

through

8,

and

the

following

additional facts which are pertinent to Respondent's cross appeal
related to Mrs. Motesfs inheritance and the manner in which the
trial court dealt with it.

Also, a correction should be made in

the original Statement of Facts in that the parties were married
for 2 0 years, not 17-1/2 years, as was initially stated.

(See

pages 1, 2 and 11 of Appellantfs Brief.)
Mrs. Motes fs father died in February of 1985 (Tr. 37) and
left a will naming her as his only heir (Tr. 45) .

His estate

consisted of approximately $140,000.00 in cash (Tr. 38, 65). She
received $30,000.00 in February of 1985 (Tr. 65), and from that
sum,

the

parties

deposited

$5,000.00

for

each of the four

children into four separate accounts, one for each child.

The

remaining $10,000.00 was applied towards family bills (Tr. 42).
In December of 1985, an additional $100,000.00 was received (Tr.
38),

and

from that each child was given another

($60,000.00)
separate

(Tr. 69).

account

$15,000.00

The remaining amount was placed in a

for Mrs. Motes.

(Mr. Motes

said

it was

$20,000.00 [Tr. 69]; however, Mrs. Motes said it was $40,000.00
[Tr. 38].)

In December, 1986, Mrs. Motes received an additional

$7,500.00 which was used to purchase a car for the parties1 son

2

(Tr. 39), and a final $3,000.00 was received in April or May of
1987 (Tr. 40).
Mr. Motes

presented

evidence relative to

$32,384.00 in

appreciation he claimed had occurred on the total inheritance
which he said he invested for the children and Mrs. Motes (Tr.
69).

He did not distinguish the appreciation attributable to

the $80,000.00 in the children's accounts from the appreciation
attributable

to

the

remaining

retained in her account.

inheritance

which

Mrs. Motes

Mr. Motes then asked that that total

appreciation be considered as marital property in his overall
proposed property distribution (Defendant's Exhibit 1), but he
asked that Mrs. Motes be awarded that appreciation, with him to
receive marital assets to offset the award of appreciation to
Mrs. Motes.
Following

trial, Mr. Motes's

counsel

prepared

proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and presented them to
Judge Rigtrup.

They were signed after the Court had made certain

handwritten

deletions

paragraphs

are

exact

and

interlineations.

reproductions

of

The
the

following

Findings

and

Conclusions entered by the Court in relation to the inherited
property issue.
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14.
inherited

The

by

defendant

the

invested

plaintiff

and

W=»

a

portion

investments

of

the

have

money

produced

tiings'^ $32,384. 00.
19.
accounts

of

plaintiff's
those

The
the

plaintiff
children

inheritance

accounts,

and

should

be

established

awarded
with

all

funds

and the right and obligation

the defendant

should

be

of

the

from

the

to manage

ordered

to

take

appropriate steps to turn those over to the plaintiff.

26.

The7$32,384.00 earned Viy U*M"difondant thgaugh hi<r

TOTHUjUHHjuL oil

the property

inherited by the plaintiff should be

considered a non-asset of the marriage.

36.

The court declares

that

it believes

that

it has

divided the property of the parties with/$87,707.00 being awarded
to the plaintiff

and/$99,913.00

being awarded to the defendant

and the extra amount has been awarded to the defendant for financial services provided to the plaintiff and the marital estate.
37.
the plaintiff

The court has determined that

it should award to

the funds that she has inherited without counting

that as part of the marital estate, although the defendant has
requested

that

this be

included

for consideration

purposes and

that part of it, that is, the money that has been earned from the
inherittnc^^rough the management of the defendant be considered
as a marital asset.

In

summary,

Judge

Rigtrup

found

that

Mrs.

Motes f s

i n h e r i t a n c e had appreciated in value $32,384.00, but t h a t
appreciation was not a marital
receive her i n h e r i t a n c e ,

asset,

that

t h a t Mrs. Motes should

and the children should receive t h e i r

accounts which were created from t h a t i n h e r i t a n c e , and t h a t Mr.
Motes should

receive

$12,206.00

more in m a r i t a l

property

to

compensate him for any of h i s e f f o r t s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o increasing
the value of the i n h e r i t a n c e .
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
The cases relied upon by Mr. Motes in responding to Mrs.
Motes f s claim that Judge Rigtrup incorrectly deferred a division
of

monthly

military

retirement

benefits

either

support Mrs.

Motes's position or are clearly distinguishable from the facts
of this case.

Under Utah law, a trial court is required to

consider retirement benefits as an asset of the marriage, and
then make a fair and equitable distribution of that asset so that
generally an equal division of the marital property is achieved.
This did not occur in this case, and, consequently, Mr. Motes,
over the five-year deferral period, will receive $89,040.00 more
in marital

property

months x 5 years)

than Mrs. Motes.

($1,484.00/month

x 12

That inequitable distribution constitutes a

major abuse of discretion and justifies a reversal on that issue.
POINT II
TAX EXEMPTIONS
The recent decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Martinez
v. Martinez, 754 P. 2d 69 (Ut. C A . 1988), requires trial courts
in Utah to award

income tax exemptions attributable to minor

children to the custodial parent in a divorce action unless one
of the following exceptions exists.
1)

The custodial parent voluntarily waives
his or her right to claim the exemption;

2)

There exists a multiple support agreement; or
5

3)

The exemption had been relinquished by the
custodial parent under a qualified pre-1985
instrument.

None of the above exceptions exist in this case; therefore, the
trial court erred in not awarding Mrs. Motes all of the minor
children as tax exemptions.
POINT III
INHERITED PROPERTY
Mr.

Motesfs

cross

appeal

on the

issue of division of

appreciation related to Mrs. Motes's inheritance is without merit
for three separate reasons.

First the trial court did consider

the appreciation in the overall property distribution by awarding
Mr. Motes $12,206.00 more in marital assets than Mrs. Motes was
awarded, and specifically stating why it was doing so.

Second,

Mr. Motes claims that the appreciation attributable to the entire
inheritance should have been part of the marital estate, even
though $80,000.00 of the inheritance had previously been given to
the parties1 children by Mrs. Motes.

Mr. Motes presented no

evidence to show what portion of the claimed appreciation was
attributable to Mrs. Motes's remaining share of the inheritance.
And, third, the manner in which the trial court dealt with the
appreciation issue in relation to the marital property, inherited
property, alimony and child support issues was consistent and
entirely in accord with the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision

6

in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 89 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah Sup. Ct.,
filed August 16, 1988).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DEFERRING DIVISION OF
THE HUS BAND• S MONTHLY MILITARY
RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR A PERIOD OF
FIVE YEARSIn order to prevail on this appeal, Appellant is required to
show

that

the

trial

court,

in making

its

distribution

of

property, misunderstood or misapplied the law, entered findings
not supported by the evidence, or caused serious inequity so as
to constitute an abuse of discretion.
P.2d 409-410 (Utah 1977).

English v. English. 565

Appellant recognizes that burden and

states that it has been met.
In this case, Judge Rigtrup misunderstood and misapplied the
law as it relates to issues of marital property and support and
caused a serious inequity to Mrs. Motes by not awarding her the
right to immediately receive the benefits from the major marital
asset acquired by the parties during this twenty-year marriage—
Major Motesfs military retirement.

This serious and material

error constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion and
its decision related to the parties1 pension plan should be
reversed.

7

Mr. Motes, in Point I of his brief, cites a number of Utah
cases which stand for the proposition that a trial court can
distribute a pension plan in any number of ways.
agrees.

However,

common

to

each

of

those

Mrs. Motes

cases

are

the

principles that any such distribution must be fair and equitable
to both parties, and that an interest in a retirement plan
acquired during a marriage, being marital property, must be
distributed in a way so as to achieve general parity between the
parties in the overall property distribution.

In this case,

Judge Rigtrup did not adhere to either of those principles and,
by

so

doing,

gave

to

Mr.

Motes

an

additional

$89,040.00

($1,484.00/month x 12 months x 5 years) in marital property.
Parenthetically, that sum does not include any cost of living or
benefit increase that may occur during the five-year period.
In claiming that the five-year delayed division of the
monthly

military

retirement benefits was correct, Mr. Motes

relies primarily on the cases of Dogu v. Doau, 652 P. 2d 1308
(Utah, 1982), and Andersen v. Andersen, 85 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, to
show the consistency of the trial court's decision with the
decisions in these cases.

These cases, however, are clearly

distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
In the Docru case, the parties divorced after a twenty-fouryear marriage.

The husband was fifty-six years old at the time

of divorce and had a successful ongoing anesthesiology practice.
8

One of the disputed issues in Dogu focused on the division of the
doctor's not yet received retirement account and the impact of
that on the future support expectations of Mrs. Dogu.
In Dogu, the doctor husband had not retired at the time of
the divorce and was not yet entitled to receive his monthly
retirement benefits.

His benefits, however, did have a fixed

value at the time of trial.

The trial court did not include the

husband's retirement fund in the overall property distribution.
Dr. Dogu agreed, claiming these funds should not be subject to
division, even though they were acquired during the marriage.
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed and remanded on the
retirement plan issue.
In

so

doing,

the

Supreme

Court

outlined

a

number

of

acceptable division alternatives available to the trial court,
each of which focused on making certain that Mrs. Dogu received
one-half of the retirement fund or an appropriate equivalent.
Most importantly, however, all of the suggested approaches were
intended to grant a wife half of the retirement fund when that
fund became available to her husband.
In the Motes case, Mr. Motes contends that allowing him to
keep the pension for five years before sharing it with the
Plaintiff is consistent with Dogu.

Mr. Motes fails to mention

that none of the situations outlined by the Court in Dogu allow
the husband to keep, and freely use this joint money for a period
9

of time prior to sharing whatever is left with his spouse.
Dogu's

suggested

methods

of

division

all

involve

directly

sharing the benefits with the wife at the time the retirement
fund is received by the husband, either by actually dividing the
benefits or providing a substitute fund from which the wife would
receive her share of the marital asset.

Therefore, Dogu supports

the position of Mrs. Motes in relation to the retirement issue.
Mr. Motes also relies on the case of Andersen v. Andersen,
85 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. June 22, 1988), and argues
that it is a case having facts analogous to the present case and
standing for the proposition that a deferred distribution of an
equity

interest

in

a

marital

residence

is

acceptable.

Unfortunately, the facts of Andersen don't fit the facts of this
case.

In Andersen, the trial court ordered the marital residence

to be sold two years from the decree, but allowed Mrs. Andersen
to use it during those two years.

When the house was sold, the

proceeds were then to be divided equally between the parties. In
so doing, Mrs. Andersen paid

for her use

of the asset by

maintaining monthly expenses related to it, thereby protecting
the asset for both parties.

When the home was sold, each party

was to share equally in any appreciation related to the asset
during the two-year period —

admittedly, a fair way to handle

that particular issue.

10

In this case, however, Mr. Motes gets to use the asset,
contributes nothing to its maintenance, receives all its earnings
for five years, while Mrs. Motes gets nothing but the child
support she would have received even if the asset didn't exist.
Mr. Motes meets his support obligation with a marital asset
without "lifting a finger," or inconveniencing himself in any way
whatsoever:

all to the detriment of Mrs. Motes. That is unfair.

It is inequitable.

It is why Judge Rigtrup was wrong.

Dogu and Andersen do not support the Defendant's assertion
that it was proper for the trial court to delay the division of
Mr. Motes's pension, allow him to receive the monthly payments
and then to pay his child support from those payments.
The

trial

court's

decision

on

the

military

retirement

payments should be reversed with any such reversal to include an
order directing that Mrs. Motes receive her share of the monthly
retirement payments that have been received since July 30, 1987- the date this matter was tried.
POINT II
POINT II OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF DOES
NOT CORRECTLY SET FORTH THE LAW IN
UTAH RELATED TO WHO IS ENTITLED TO
THE DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS IN A
DIVORCE PROCEEDING.
Mr. Motes, in Point II of his brief, argues that this
Court's decision in Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P. 2d 69 (Ut. C.A.
1988) , dealt only with the issue of whether or not there was a
11

"qualified pre-1985 instrument11 so as to allow Dr. Martinez to
claim two of the children as exemptions for federal income tax
purposes.

He goes on to suggest that the issue as to whether or

not a trial court can allocate income tax exemptions to a noncustodial

parent,

vis-a-vis

the

federal

statute

which

automatically grants the exemption to the custodial parent is
still an "open question" in Utah.

His suggestion is wrong.

has misconstrued

interpreted

and

erroneously

He

the holding in

Martinez.
Like the trial court in the present case, the trial court in
Martinez, supra, awarded Dr. Martinez, the non-custodial parent,
two of the parties1 three children as exemptions and ordered Mrs.
Martinez to sign the required waivers.

(In this case, Mr. Motes

received one of the children as an exemption and the trial court
ordered Mrs. Motes to sign the required waiver.)
Mrs. Martinez appealed that award, and claimed that she was
entitled under federal law to claim all of the children as
exemptions because she was the custodial parent and that the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, in light of
the 1984 Tax Report Act and its effect on 26 USC Section 152
(Supp.

1988),

prevents

a

state

court

from

allocating

tax

exemptions between the parties to a divorce action.
This Court agreed with Mrs. Martinez and reversed the trial
court on that issue, and as a matter of right, awarded her all
12

three exemptions.

Dr. Martinez then petitioned the Utah Supreme

Court for a Writ of Certiorari on the exemption issue in Martinez
v. Martinez (Utah Supreme Court Case No. 880189, petition filed
May 17, 1988).
In his petition, Dr. Martinez argued that 26 U.S.C. Section
152 does not limit the broad authority of a trial court in
divorce actions to allocate tax exemptions, but only requires
that a custodial parent sign a written declaration stating he or
she will not claim the child as a dependent.

He went on to argue

that federal law further does not prohibit a state court from
determining an equitable distribution of the tax exemptions and
ordering a custodial spouse to execute the required form if it
chose to award an exemption to the non-custodial parent.
This is the same argument now being made by Mr. Motes. The
Utah Supreme Court denied Dr. Martinez's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari on the exemption issue on October 4, 1988.
Mr.

Motes has attempted to argue that in spite of the

holding in Martinez, supra, the law in Utah is still unsettled in
regard to the Court's power to allocate income tax exemptions in
divorce actions.

To the contrary, Martinez very clearly sets

forth the law on exemptions in Utah when Judge Davidson wrote:
. . . Plaintiff requested the tax exemptions
for all three children but the trial court's
order did not honor that request.
This
result is contrary to the general provisions
of section 152(e).
Any argument that the
stipulation and separation agreement
13

qualifies as a pre-1985 instrument where
plaintiff willingly relinquishes her right to
the exemptions under federal law, neglects
plaintiff's rejection of its terms in the
post-divorce period.
By amending her
complaint,
plaintiff
modified
and
affirmatively rejected the pre-divorce
distribution. Plaintiff is entitled to the
tax exemptions for all of the children in
view of the award of custody to her and the
failure of defendant to establish any
exception to the general rule stated above.
Id. at 754 P.2d 69, 72. (Emphasis added.)
In Martinez, the decree required Mrs. Martinez to execute
the necessary waiver to allow her husband to claim two of the
three children.

That mandate of the trial court was considered

by the Court of Appeals and specifically rejected by concluding
that none of the three exceptions to section 152(e) existed and
therefore the trial court erred in awarding Dr. Martinez any of
the exemptions whatsoever.
In spite of the very clear language in Martinez, Mr. Motes
argues that two lines of reasoning have emerged from the states
who have been presented with the issue and that Utah has not
adopted either.

The first concludes that the federal statute is

controlling and state courts cannot order a custodial parent to
execute a waiver, while the second line concludes state courts
can make such an order.

(See page 15 of Respondent's Brief.)

Mr. Motes1s attempt to argue that the second approach is the
better approach is without merit in that this Court has already
elected to follow the first approach and award the exemptions to
14

the custodial parent and thereby give priority to the federal
statute

and

Constitution.

the

supremacy

clause

of

the

United

States

That is the clear conclusion of Martinez, and

consequently the law in Utah.
Point II of Respondent's Brief is without merit.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF
HER
INHERITANCE
AND
ITS
APPRECIATION AS HER SOLE AND
SEPARATE PROPERTY.
In the cross appeal filed by Mr. Motes, he argues that "the
trial court erred in refusing to consider the appreciation in the
Plaintiff's inheritance as an asset which should be considered in
dividing the property between the parties" (Respondent's Brief,
p. 21) .

That argument is flawed in three separate ways, each

being fatal in and of itself.
First, the trial court did consider the appreciation related
to any inheritance received by Mrs. Motes by awarding Mr. Motes
more marital property than Mrs. Motes in the overall property
distribution.
Second, Mr. Motes claim an interest in the appreciation
attributable to the entire inheritance, even though $80,000.00 of
it had earlier been given to the parties' children and therefore,
was not part of the marital estate.
15

Third, Mr. Motes presented no evidence as to what portion of
the appreciation was attributable to that part of the inheritance
which Mrs, Motes retained and in spite of that, the trial court
gratuitously gave him credit for his claim investment expertise
and efforts.
The most current statement of the law in Utah as to how
gifted and inherited property is to be handled in divorce actions
is found in the case of Mortensen v. Mortensen, 89 Utah Adv. Rep.
7

(Utah Sup. Ct., filed August

incorrectly

cited

16, 1988).

Respondent has

this case as support for the argument he

attempts to make in Point III of his brief.

(See Respondent's

Citation of Supplemental Authority, dated September 29, 1988.)
In fact, Mortensen supports Mrs. Motes!s claim that the
trial court considered the inheritance and related appreciation
and the efforts Mr. Motes claimed he expended in connection with
that appreciation in relation to its overall property and debt
distribution and its award of alimony and child support.
In writing for the majority in Mortensen, Justice Howe set
forth what the law in Utah is on gifted and inherited property.
We conclude that in Utah, trial courts
making "equitable" property division pursuant
to section 3 0-3-4 should, in accordance with
the rule prevailing
in most
other
jurisdictions and with the division made in
many of our own cases, generally award
property acquired by one spouse by gift and
inheritance during the marriage (or property
acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse,
together with any appreciation or enhancement
16

of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has
by his or her efforts or expense contributed
to the enhancement, maintenance, or
protection of that property, thereby
acquiring an equitable interest in it, Dubois
v, Dubois, supra, or (2) the property has
been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling or exchanges or where the
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an
interest therein to the other spouse. Cf.
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah
1980) . An exception to this rule would be
where part or all of the gift or inheritance
is awarded to the nondonee or nonheir spouse
in lieu of alimony as was done in Weaver v.
Weaver, supra. The remaining property should
be divided equitably between the parties as
in other divorce cases, but not necessarily
with strict mathematical equality. Teece v.
Teece, 715 P.2d 106 (Utah 1986). However, in
making that division, the donee or heir
spouse should not lose the benefit of his or
her gift or inheritance by the trial court's
automatically or arbitrarily awarding the
other spouse an equal amount of the remaining
property which was acquired by their joint
efforts to offset the gifts or inheritance.
Any significant disparity in the division of
the remaining property should be based on an
equitable rationale, other than on the sole
fact that one spouse is awarded his or her
gifts or inheritance.
The fact that one
spouse has inherited or donated property,
particularly if it is income-producing, may
properly be considered as eliminating or
reducing the need for alimony by that spouse
or as a source of income for the payment of
child support or alimony (where awarded) by
that spouse.
Such property might also be
utilized to provide housing for minor
children or utilized in other extraordinary
situations where equity so demands.
These
rules will preserve and give effect to the
right that married persons have always had in
this state to separately own and enjoy
property.
It also accords with the normal
intent of donors or deceased persons that
their gifts and inheritances should be kept
17

within their family and succession should not
be diverted because of divorce.
Id at 9 and 10.
In addition, after reading the transcript of the trial
court1 ruling from the bench (Tr. 23-35, Vol. II), the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce (R. 190216), and Point III of Respondent's Brief (p. 19), it becomes
very apparent that Mr. Motes has absolutely no basis to claim
that the trial court did not consider the appreciation which was
related to the inheritance Mrs. Motes received in 1985.
contrary,

it did

consider

that

claim,

as

is

shown by the

following excerpts from the Findings and Conclusions.
8.
In February, 1985, the plaintiff's
father died. When the parties went to the
home that he had occupied, they found and
removed from the home $30,000.00 in cash.
The plaintiff's father made plaintiff his
sole heir and she has inherited the said
$3 0,000.00 in cash at the time of her
father's death, $100,000.00 in December,
1985; $7,500.00 in November, 1986; and
$3,000.00 in December, 1986, for a total of
$140,500.00. The estate has not been finally
distributed, but most of it has been
disbursed. (R. 192, Findings.)
9.
After the parties removed the
$3 0,000.00 from the plaintiff's father's
home, $20,000.00 was given to the defendant
by the plaintiff to invest for their children
and accounts were opened up in the sum of
$5,000.00 for each of the four children of
the parties. After the $100,000.00 payment
had been received, an additional $10,000.00
was set aside for each of the children of the
parties.
There are, now, $15,000.00 plus
earnings in the accounts of each of the
18

To the

children of the parties for
$60,000,00 plus earnings.
Findings.)

a

total of
(R. 192,

14. The defendant invested a portion of
the money inherited by the plaintiff and
those investments have produced earnings
approximating $32,384.00.
(R. 200,
Conclusions.)

19. The plaintiff should be awarded all
of the accounts of the children established
with funds from the plaintiff's inheritance
and the right and obligation to manage those
accounts, and the defendant should be ordered
to take appropriate steps to turn those over
to the plaintiff. (R. 200, Conclusions.)

26. The
approximate
amount
of
$32,384.00 earned on the property inherited
by the plaintiff should be considered a nonasset
of the marriage.
(R. 201,
Conclusions.)

36. The court declares that it
believes that it has divided the property of
the parties with approximately $87,707.00
being awarded to the plaintiff and
approximately $99,913.00 being awarded to the
defendant, exclusive of household furniture
and goods and personal property not otherwise
included, and the extra amount has been
awarded to the defendant for financial
services provided to the plaintiff and the
marital estate.
(R. 203-4, Conclusions.)
37. The court has determined that it
should award to the plaintiff the funds that
she has inherited without counting that as
part of the marital estate, although the
19

defendant has requested that this be included
for consideration purposes and that part of
it, that is, the money that has been earned
from the inheritance in part through the
management of the defendant be considered as
a marital asset. (R. 204, Conclusions.)
For some inexplicable reason, and in spite of these Findings
and Conclusions, Mr. Motes now argues that he received nothing
from the trial court for the efforts he claimed he expended in
investing and managing Mrs. Motes's inheritance.

Consequently,

he argues that he's now entitled to share in the appreciation of
all the inherited money, regardless of whether its Mrs. Motesfs
or the children's.
In fact, those efforts and any appreciation was specifically
considered by the Court by its award to Mr. Motes of $12,2 06.00
more in marital property than it awarded to Mrs. Motes with a
very clear explanation as to why the Court was doing what it did.
Given the Findings and Conclusions set out above and the
specific allocation of marital property which gave Mr. Motes
$12,206.00 more than Mrs. Motes, how can he now in good faith
argue that
. . . the trial court erred in refusing to
consider the appreciation in the plaintiff's
inheritance as an asset which should be
considered in dividing property between the
parties.
p. 21, Respondent's Brief.
The answer to that question is possibly found on page 2 3 of
the Respondent's Brief, when he states
20

In this case the defendant [Mr. Motes]
decided to ask the court to rule on the
division of the appreciation in the
inheritance only after the plaintiff had
already appealed the case to this court. Id.
The decision of the trial court in the inheritance and
related appreciation issue is correct and falls squarely within
the broad discretion of the trial court to fashion remedies which
can best fairly fit the facts of the case before it.

Here the

Court returned to Mrs. Motes her inheritance and any appreciation
related to what she retained, gave Mr. Motes a $12,000.00 credit,
awarded alimony of $1.00 per year to each and awarded minimal
child support —

all of which is consistent with the holding,

approach and concepts set forth in Mortensen, supra.
Mr. Motes's cross appeal on this issue is without merit and
should be denied.

Further, when the statement appearing on page

23 of his brief is considered in light of the record and the
clear findings of the trial court, Mrs. Motesfs request for
attorneys1 fees and costs related to this appeal and cross appeal
should be granted.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion in the manner it dealt
with Mr. Motes's military retirement benefits and, consequently,
gave

to

Mr. Motes,

over

a

five-year

period,

approximately

$89,000.00 more than Mrs. Motes will receive from that asset.
That portion of Judge Rigtrup's decision should be reversed and
21

remanded with instructions to divide the pension plans of the
parties using an appropriate formula for division, such as the
one suggested in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982),
and reimburse Mrs. Motes for her share of the monthly retirement
benefits received by Mr. Motes since July 30, 1987,
The recent decision of Martinez v. Martinez, supra, requires
that Judge Rigtrup's award of the income tax exemption for one of
the minor children to Mr. Motes be reversed on the grounds that
federal law in effect at the time of trial requires that the
custodial parent receive the exemptions unless certain exceptions
can be shown, none of which are present in this case. Mrs. Motes
is entitled to claim all three children as exemptions, commencing
with the 1987 tax year.
The cross appeal of Mr. Motes on the issue of appreciation
related

to Mrs. Motes's inheritance

findings

clearly

show

that

the

is without merit.

trial

court

did

The

consider

appreciation related to that inheritance by awarding Mr. Motes
$12,000.00 more in marital assets than Mrs. Motes in order to
compensate

him

connection

with

for the
that

services

he

appreciation.

claimed
That

he

rendered

portion

of

in

Judge

Rigtrup's decision should be affirmed.
Finally, an award of attorneys1 fees and costs on appeal to
Mrs. Motes is appropriate for two reasons.

First, because the

trial court incorrectly adopted an "income stream" theory urged
22

by Mr. Motes

in relation to the military

retirement when it

should have been treated as property and divided at the time.
Mrs. Motes had no other option than to appeal.
required to bear those costs.

She should not be

Second, Mr. Motes f s cross appeal

is without merit and evidently was filed only because Mrs. Motes
appealed the retirement issue.

(See p. 23 of Mr. Motes ! s brief.)

The costs of addressing that issue should not be borne by Mrs.
Motes nor should Mr. Motes's cavalier approach to that issue be
sanctioned by this Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of October, 1988.
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